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This paper employs a number of models to examine whether the structural adjustment
programmes of the World Bank have had any effect on the standards of living and
human development indices in the treated countries. It appears that while during the
adjustment period the average real per capita income has grown faster in the treated
countries this has not been the pattern for the indicators of standards of living.
Although there exists a relationship between the human development indices and
income for countries considered, the income elasticity of the non-income components
of the human development indices examined here are very low for the countries which
have benefited for a longer period from the structural adjustment loans and similarly
for the non-treated countries. It seems that the physical standards of living examined
here, though depending on per capita income, were relatively more influenced by other
factors.   In conclusion the validity of a high concentration of adjustment programmes
on income growth as the main target is questioned.2
Structural Adjustments and Standards of Living in Developing Countries
Introduction
The World Bank's Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) to developing countries have
been the source of  considerable  controversy in the literature.  The  conditions
attached to these loans were believed to correct domestic  economic  policies  and
aimed at controlling inflationary pressures and enhancing the efficiency of the supply
side in the economy. They included fiscal and monetary  tightness,  wage control,
promotion of free markets, trade  liberalisation, privatisation  and  devaluation.
Structural adjustment policies were initially designed by the World Bank to
complement the poverty alleviation programmes (Summers et al 1993, Please 1996)
and reduce the economic distortions  which were hampering the social profitability of
investment projects (Kanbur 1991). They aim at increasing the overall real income of
the country concerned which in turn is regarded as the main factor for improving the
standards of living and reducing poverty. There is little disagreement on these basic
objectives of the adjustment policies, however, the controversy is in relation to the
adopted strategy. It is therefore logical that  these programmes should be evaluated
ultimately in terms of their effects on poverty  and standards of living. A number of
recent studies  conclude that  these policies have had adverse effect on the standards
 of living  of the poor in developing countries (Cornia et  al  1987, Stewart  1995,
UNRISD 1995). Furthermore, it has been suggested that “…over-reliance on
conditionality leads to major misallocation of resources and large-scale waste of public
money.” (Killick, 1996). The Bank on the other hand argued that the  above policies
have had little negative impact on the standards of living in the treated countries
(World Bank 1992).
 The  effects of SALs on poverty and standards of  living   could conceivably  be
appraised from two angles: (i) whether  the  poor section  of population has been
(adversely) affected, (ii)  whether the  living  conditions  as measured by the average
measures  of standards  of living have been affected. Investigating the  first question
 requires  individual  country studies of  the  poor  in different  treated countries.
(1)
 The  second line of investigation has its implicit  limitations.  It does  not  address the
distributional issues  which  may  conceal relative  poverty or even give rise to absolute3
poverty.  However with  reference to the nature of the recommended adjustments  the
second  angle of investigation seems to be more suitable  to  the appraisal of these
programmes. As the  structural adjustment policies have relatively little or  no effective
distributional policies built into them, they can hardly claim  to  be  effective in
removing relative  poverty  in  the treated  countries. On the contrary, it has been
argued that they may have possible adverse distributional consequences. However,
they may be assessed, perhaps partially,  in  terms  of their  effects  on the average
standards of living, and to some extent, regardless of their distributional aspects. This
approach has been adopted by a number of studies (World Bank 1992, Stewart 1995
and Kakwani 1995) which compare the adjusting countries with the non-adjusting ones
using a set of social indicators. In general there is little disagreement on the role of
economic growth in increasing incomes, however, there are some concerns on whether
economic growth would necessarily lead to improvements in the standards of living
(Dreze and Sen 1990). Some scholars are concerned with the inconsistencies between
the adjustment programmes and policies needed for the development of the countries
concerned. Structural adjustments involve cuts in public expenditure which primarily
affect expenditure on education, health and other social aspect needed for the
development of human capabilities (Stewart 1994). Others suggest that conditionality
attached to these programmes should be relevant to the ultimate objectives of poverty
alleviation and human development rather than to economic instruments and, hence,
their effectiveness should be assessed in these terms (Singer 1995).
Evaluation Methodology
Various approaches are proposed for the assessment of the effects of SAL
programmes. Amongst them the so-called  with versus without method has been
employed frequently (for examples see Mosley et al 1991, World Bank 1992 and
Kakwani 1995). In this approach we compare what has happened with the programme
with what we assume would have happened without it. It relies on comparing the
situation in those countries in receipt of SAL with that belonging to a group of
countries, control group,  which have not received SAL. It has been suggested that
this method appears to be holding the extraneous influences on both groups constant
and thereby discounting them (Mosley 1991) while it has its limitations (Summers4
1993). Nevertheless it allows us to see “whether countries which have adopted the
conditions are doing better than countries which have not adopted them” and has been
“often adopted by the IMF and the World Bank” (both quotes from Singer 1995, p13).
The addition of time dimension makes the assessment more interesting and meaningful.
In effect we can compare the recipient group with the non-recipient group before and
during the SAL programmes. This would allow for the possibility of detecting  special
circumstances in any of the groups before the receipt of SAL which may be prevailing.
Crucial to this approach is the selection of the control group. There are slightly
different classifications for this purpose in the literature. We adopted the classification
proposed by The World Bank (Massland 1992) which recognises three groups of
countries. Those countries which had implemented structural adjustment policies early
on and had received early-intensive adjustment lending (EIALs) - including 25
countries - those which received other adjustment lending (OALs) - 29 countries - and
finally non-adjustment lending countries (NALs) - including 32 countries.
(2) A full list
of these countries is presented in appendix A.
We selected five social indicators for comparing the living standards in the above
mentioned groups of countries before and during SAL periods. These are infant
mortality rate (IMR), life expectancy (LE), adult literacy (AL), gross primary
enrolment ratio (PER) and per capita calorie supply (CAL). In addition the Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP$) estimates of real GDP per capita were employed to reflect the
income differentials amongst the selected countries. The data were mainly obtained
from various issues of the Human Development Report and the World Bank database
and where necessary the annual real GDP growth rates were used to estimate the
(PPP$)  GDP per capita, appropriately..
The performance of the selected social indicators were studied during two periods:
pre-SAL (1970-85) and SAL (1986-92) periods. These periods were selected on the
grounds that most SAL agreements dated back to the early 80s.
Descriptive analysis
Preliminary descriptive analysis of data revealed remarkable differences between the
three groups of countries and their sub-groups. Table 1 compares average annual
growth rates for the selected indicators for the EIAL, OAL and NAL countries, as well5
as those for the low-income and middle-income countries in each group, for the pre-
SAL and SAL periods.
Table 1. Average annual growth rates  for different groups of  countries
70-85 86-92 70-85 86-92
*
IMR PER
 EIAL -3.2 -2.8  EIAL 1.6 0.2
  low-income -1.8 -2.5   low-income 3.3 0.3
  middle-income -4.5 -3.0   middle-income 0.4 0.1
 OAL -2.0 -2.2  OAL 2.1 1.2
  low-income -1.5 -1.4   low-income 2.7 2.1
  middle-income -2.9 -3.6   middle-income 1.1 -0.2
 NAL -3.0 -3.7  NAL 2.5 0.1
  low-income -1.8 -2.3   low-income 2.3 -0.3
  middle-income -3.6 -4.6   middle-income 2.5 0.3
LE CAL
 EIAL 0.8 0.5  EIAL 0.5 0.0
  low-income 0.8 0.7   low-income 0.3 -0.8
  middle-income 0.8 0.4   middle-income 0.7 0.8
 OAL 0.8 0.4  OAL 0.3 0.1
  low-income 0.8 0.5   low-income 0.1 0.3
  middle-income 0.8 0.3   middle-income 0.6 -0.1
 NAL 0.8 0.7  NAL 0.6 -0.3
  low-income 0.7 0.5   low-income 0.3 -0.9
  middle-income 0.8 0.8   middle-income 0.7 0.1
AL GDP
 EIAL 2.5 0.9  EIAL 1.3 8.5
  low-income 3.8 2.2   low-income 0.0 8.7
  middle-income 1.6 -0.1   middle-income 2.5 8.3
 OAL 3.0 2.6  OAL 1.9 6.3
  low-income 3.9 3.3   low-income 0.1 5.9
  middle-income 1.7 1.5   middle-income 2.8 6.9
 NAL 2.0 1.6  NAL 1.9 5.2
  low-income 2.2 2.1   low-income 1.1 2.5
  middle-income 1.8 1.4   middle-income 2.4 6.8
* Data for calorie supply are for 86-90 period.
During 70-85 the average annual rate of decline in the infant mortality rate in the
EIALs was above that of the NALs with the rate of decline for OALs being the lowest.
For the SAL period of 86-92 there was a remarkable change in this order. The rate of
decline for NALs for this period was higher than those for the EIALs and OALs.
Moreover, there was an inter-period drop in the rate of decline for the EIALs while the
same for the NALs improved significantly with a marginal improvement in the rate for
the OALs. With respect to the income sub-groups there were similar inter-period
improvements in this rate for the EIAL and NAL low-income countries with a marginal
drop in the rate of decline for the OAL low-income countries. In the case of middle-6
income countries the rate of decline during the SAL period dropped significantly for
the EIALs as compared to the same for the pre-SAL period. In contrast the same for
the NALs improved remarkably which was also the case, to a lesser extent, for the
OALs. Overall, judging from the above results one cannot reject the proposition that
during the SAL period the drop in the infant mortality rate for the EIAL countries
slowed down significantly as compared to the same for the NAL countries. Nor can
one reject the proposition that during the SAL period the NAL countries achieved
better results than the other two groups in this respect.
As for the annual rate of increase in life expectancy all groups experienced a drop as
we move from one period to the next. For the EIAL and OAL groups the decline was
more pronounced than that of the NAL group. For the middle-income sub-groups the
highest inter-period decline belonged to the EIALs while the rate for the NALs
remained constant. As for the low-income sub-groups the OALs and NALs had similar
performances with that of the EIALs being somewhat better. Overall, with respect to
this indicator one cannot reject the proposition that the NAL countries were better off
than the other two groups.
As compared to the rate for the pre-SAL period the average annual rate of increase in
adult literacy during the SAL period, declined for all the SAL groups. However, the
decline was much more considerable for the EIAL group. The average low-income
EIAL country experienced a relatively higher inter-period decline in this rate as
compared to the corresponding sub-groups of the OAL and NAL countries. As for the
middle-income sub-groups while all of them experienced a drop in the rate of increase
again the average country in the EIAL middle-income sub-group suffered a harsher
decline during the SAL period. Once again, with respect to this indicator one cannot
reject the proposition that the EIAL countries were worse off as compared to the other
two groups.
As compared to the pre-SAL period the rate of increase in gross primary enrolment
slowed down for all groups of countries during the SAL period. However, the drop
was more steep for the NALs and EIALs. The average low-income NAL and EIAL
countries were much worse off than the corresponding OAL country. As for the
middle-income sub-groups the average EIAL country experienced a lower inter-period
decline in this rate than the average country in the other two groups.7
 For the indicator of calorie supply per capita the worst inter-period performance
belonged to the NAL group, though the rates for all groups dropped from an already
low base. Amongst the low-income countries the OAL sub-group did better as
compared to others while the performances of the EIAL and NAL sub-groups were
similar. The best performance for the middle-income sub-group belonged to the EIALs
with the rates for the corresponding NAL and OAL sub-groups remaining just positive
and becoming just negative, respectively.
There were remarkable inter-period improvements in the annual rate of growth of GDP
per capita for all groups. However, the rate for the average EIALs was superior to
those belonging to the other groups with the OALs exhibiting a better performance
than the NALs. Amongst the low-income sub-groups the rate for the EIAL countries
was extraordinarily good. As for the middle-income sub-groups again the OAL and
EIAL countries enjoyed a much better rate of growth than the NAL sub-group.
Overall, with respect to this indicator, undoubtedly the performance of the EIAL
countries was much better than the NAL group during the SAL period. On the basis of
these results one cannot reject the proposition that the adjustment programmes have
resulted in an increase in the level of income.
Effects of Adjustment Programmes
The above results have an interesting implication. While the average performance of
the EIAL countries  in raising their real income per capita during the SAL period has
been much better than that of the NAL countries, the reverse seems to be the case for
three of the selected non-income indicators of standards of living with the remaining
two exhibiting intriguing results. This raises a number of questions of which the most
interesting ones are: (i) Are there some relationships between these social indicators
and the income indicator? (ii) Have these relationships changed between the pre-SAL
and SAL periods? (iii) Are there any differences between the EIAL, OAL and NAL
countries in these respects? In brief can we take for granted that an increase in the level
of  income would result in an increase in other aspects of welfare?
The answers to these questions may throw light on the debate on the relationship
between income and social indicators and on whether the SAL policies have affected
the standards of living via improving income in the treated countries.8
To investigate the above questions we initially employed the following model :
Welfare indicator = a a a b 0 1 1 2 2 + + + + d d AGDP u                                                (1)
Where the welfare indicator refers to the individual selected indicators of standard of
living, AGDP is the real average income per capita in $PPP, d1 is the dummy variable
for the EIAL countries (=1 for the EIAL countries and =0 for others) and d2 is the
dummy variable for the OAL countries (=1 for the OAL countries and =0 for others).
The parameters a1 and a 2 are the differential intercepts for EIAL and OAL countries
from the base category of NAL countries with the intercept of  a 0. If the coefficient of
a dummy variable proves to be statistically significant we may then conclude that there
is a significant differential intercept between the corresponding group and the base
category group of countries with no structural adjustment programme (NAL).
A general problem in cross-country regression analysis is the possible presence of
heteroscedasticity. As our sample includes developing countries we suspect that such
likelihood may have been lessened. However, for every regression we employed two
tests: (i) the Park Test and (ii) the Spearman Rank Correlation Test. The results are
presented in Appendix B. Where we could not reject the presence of heteroscedastic
data we used the weighted least squares method of estimation using countries’
population as weights.9
Table 2. Regression results for social indicators - model (1)
      1970 - 1985
Coefficient   t-value
  1986 - 1992
Coefficient   t-value
Infant mortality rate
   AGDP      -0.024         -9.96
**        -0.015    -10.56
**
   EIAL Dummy      -5.931         -0.77        -1.954      -0.29
   OAL  Dummy       3.707          0.49         8.289        1.23
   Constant   142.983        19.78
**     114.008      18.85
**
R
2                  0.57                   0.63
F                36.3
**                  42.9
**
Life expectancy
   AGDP       0.006         12.10
**         0.003      12.06
**
   EIAL Dummy       0.477           0.32        -0.571      -0.38
   OAL  Dummy      -1.383         -0.94        -2.232      -1.50
   Constant     44.822         31.87
**       50.372      37.09
**
R
2                  0.67                   0.67
F                54.0
**                 55.4
**
Adult literacy
   AGDP       0.015           9.25
**         0.008       7.99
**
   EIAL Dummy       4.345           0.86         3.563       0.73
   OAL  Dummy      -2.419         -0.49       -3.119      -0.64
   Constant     25.878           5.57
**      40.761        9.06
**
R
2                  0.60                   0.51
F                32.5




   AGDP       0.011           5.04
**         0.006       3.51
**
   EIAL Dummy      -5.787         -0.95      -16.105     -2.36
*
   OAL  Dummy     12.863           3.03
**       16.023       3.06
**
   Constant     70.986         16.88
**       86.872     18.36
**
R
2                  0.35                   0.36
F                12.1




   AGDP       0.211          9.99
**         0.177        8.43
**
   EIAL Dummy     30.825          0.46       67.913        0.89
   OAL  Dummy       8.056          0.12      -11.724      -0.15
   Constant 1966.250         30.92
**    2010.328     27.77
**
R
2                                      0.57                   0.52
F                34.9
**                 26.2
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.
# Data for calorie supply for SAL period are for 1986-90.
Table 2 represents the regression results for the selected five welfare indicators. In all
cases the significant computed F supports the proposed model. For all welfare
indicators the coefficient of AGDP is significant for both pre-SAL and SAL periods.
This gives support to the hypothesis that higher income would improve the standard of10
living and therefore endorses the policy of targeting the increase in the real income.
The coefficients of both dummy variables for welfare indicators, with the exception of
those for the gross primary enrolment ratio equation, are not significant. This means
that for the period before the SAL there has been no significant difference between the
EIAL or OAL countries and the NAL countries. More importantly the results for the
1986-92 period indicate that  SALs have not resulted in any significant change in this
respect. It is also notable that AGDP during the SAL period has remained significant in
the case of all indicators of standard of living.
In all cases, except one, tests of heteroscedacticity resulted in rejecting the (hypothesis
of) presence of heteroscedasticity. The exceptional case is the equation for the gross
primary enrolment ratio. As neither of the tests employed could reject the possibility of
different error variances for both periods ( see Table B1 in Appendix B ) the weighted
least squares method was used for estimation.
(3) The results indicate that the
coefficients of the AGDP, the OAL dummy and the constant are significant for both
periods. For the SAL period the coefficient of the EIAL dummy is also significant and
negative. This means that the gross enrolment ratio for the EIAL countries is
potentially lower than that of the NAL countries for the SAL period, an indication of a
possible adverse social effect of SALs. This result is of particular significance when we
consider some of the critics of adjustment programmes which refer to the likelihood of
vulnerable households, facing harsher economic conditions, being forced to withdraw
their children from school to undertake family labour. The OAL countries seem to be
doing better than the other two groups as their significant differential intercept is
positive. While the coefficients of determination for this particular indicator is less
impressive than those for other welfare indicators the F statistics for all models are
significant at 1% level of significance.
The Effect of Adult Literacy
The effect of literacy on other indicators of standards of living and human development
has been regarded to be of fundamental importance (Human Development Report-
various issues, Desai 1993, Streeten 1994 and Kakwani 1995, ). In the light of these
we tested the following model:11
Welfare indicator = a a a b b 0 1 1 2 2 1 2 + + + + + d d AGDP AAL u                              (2)
Where AAL is the average literacy rate and all other variables and parameters are as
before. The results in Table 3 indicate significant improvements in the fit for the
remaining indicators.
Table 3. Regression results for social indicators - model (2)
          1970 - 1985
Coefficient       t-value
         1986 - 1992
Coefficient      t-value
Infant mortality rate
   AGDP      -0.006         -2.54
**        -0.008      -5.51
**
   AAL      -1.114         -8.90
**        -0.924      -7.70
**
   EIAL Dummy       1.941          0.38         4.384       0.86
   OAL  Dummy       9.164          1.86         7.132       1.42
   Constant   163.955        28.92
**     151.883     22.68
**
R
2                  0.84                   0.81
F                80.7
**                 76.4
**
Life expectancy
   AGDP       0.003           5.65
**         0.002        6.85
**
   AAL       0.206           8.95
**         0.210        8.04
**
   EIAL Dummy      -1.436         -1.53        -1.910      -1.74
   OAL  Dummy      -2.497         -2.75
**        -2.002      -1.83
   Constant     40.778         39.04
**       41.653      28.37
**
R
2                                                   0.89                   0.84
F              126.1




   AGDP       0.001           0.23        -0.001      -0.86
   AAL       0.816           7.99
**         0.908        7.48
**
   EIAL Dummy      -5.748         -1.31        -8.729      -1.82
   OAL  Dummy      -9.378         -2.19
*        -4.955      -0.95
   Constant     41.785          8.46
**       40.749       6.02
**
R
2                  0.77                   0.68
F                45.0




   AGDP       0.174          5.60
**         0.172        5.62
**
   AAL       0.018          0.01        -0.121       -0.06
   EIAL Dummy     29.841          0.47       42.003         0.52
   OAL  Dummy    -16.050        -0.26      -44.538       -0.56
   Constant 2018.357         28.62
**    2057.442     19.37
**
R
2                  0.56                   0.50
F                20.2
**                 17.1
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.  * Coefficient significant  at 5% level.
# Data for calorie supply are for 1986-90.12
For the infant mortality indicator during the 70-85 period the coefficient of adult
literacy, along with that of income, is highly significant with the expected negative
sign. It is interesting to note that for the 86-92 period the effect of income variable has
increased and that of the adult literacy has decreased, though slightly. Nevertheless
both have remained significant. Once again the differential intercepts, the coefficients
of EIAL and OAL dummies, are insignificant in both periods while the constant has
remained highly significant. This indicates that there are no significant changes from
the base category’s intercept ( NAL countries) for both EIAL and OAL countries in
both periods. The coefficient of determination and the value of the computed F for
both periods have improved as compared with the previous model.
Similarly, for the life expectancy indicator the coefficient of adult literacy, along with
that of income, is highly significant for both before and during the SAL periods. The
same is true for the constant. It is interesting to note that while the coefficient of the
EIAL dummy remains insignificant that of the OAL dummy for the 70-85 period is just
significant with a negative sign. This means that the differential intercept for the OAL
countries is now 38.281 indicating that the average life expectancy for the OAL
countries for the said period has been lower than that of the NAL countries by nearly
2.5 years. However, this difference is insignificant for the SAL period. Once again both
R
2 and F have improved substantially.
The inclusion of adult literacy as an explanatory variable resulted in a remarkable
change in the model for the primary enrolment ratio. For both periods R
2 and F have
improved notably as compared to the previous model. The coefficient of AGDP is no
longer significant, however, that of the adult literacy and the constant term are highly
significant. It seems that adult literacy explains variations in this indicator better than
the income indicator. The coefficient of the OAL dummy is significant and negative for
the 70-85 period. This differential intercept means that on average the primary
enrolment ratio in these countries was lower than that of the NAL countries by just
above 9%. In the after SAL period, however, this coefficient becomes insignificant. In
this respect it seems that the pattern for this indicator is the same as the one for the life
expectancy indicator. One is tempted to suggest that in the case of the OAL countries
there seems to be some positive changes taking place for the SAL period.  The
coefficient of the EIAL dummy remains insignificant for both periods.13
The inclusion of adult literacy as an explanatory variable in the model did not result in
an improvement in the fit for the per capita calorie supply indicator. The coefficient of
adult literacy is insignificant for both periods. The constant has remained significant
while the coefficient of the dummies are insignificant. Once again these results support
the suggestion that the EIAL and OAL countries are not significantly different to NAL
countries in terms of the intercept of the regression.
Tests of heteroscedasticity concluded that there is no evidence of the presence of this
problem in data (see Table B2 in Appendix B).
Slope Differentials Amongst Structural Adjustment Loan Groups
So far we have only questioned the validity of ‘parallel regressions’ and tested for the
hypothesis of differential intercepts. In other words we implicitly assumed that the
slope of the regression is common for all three groups of countries. However, it is
possible that the slope and/or the intercept of the regression to be different for EIAL,
OAL and NAL groups of countries. To test for differential slopes and intercepts we
employed the following model.
Welfare indicator = a a a b b b 0 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 3 2 + + + + + + d d AGDP d AGDP d AGDP u ( ) ( )
                                                                                                                              (3)
In the above model d1 and d2 are the EIAL and OAL dummy variables respectively.
Hence their coefficients, a1 and a 2, reflect the differential intercepts for these
countries, from the base category’s intercept,a 0, accordingly. The coefficients b2  and
b3 are the differential slope coefficients. They indicate by how much the slope of the
regression for the respective groups of EIAL and OAL countries would be different to
the slope for the base group of NAL countries, b1. Variables di AGDP are simply the
product of the dummy variables di and the AGDP.
Table 4 represents the results for the above model. For infant mortality rate the
coefficient of  the income variable has the right expected sign and is, along with the
constant, significant for the 70-85 period. For the 86-92 period, however, the
coefficient of d2AGDP and that of OAL dummy are also significant. This means that
there is a difference between the intercepts and slopes of the regressions for the OAL14
and NAL countries. It indicates that basically for OAL countries the level of infant
mortality rate is higher (as their intercept is higher), however, the relationship between
this indicator of welfare and the income indicator is stronger (as the slope is higher).
There is no structural difference in intercept and slope between EIAL and NAL
countries. The computed F indicates a significant regression model.
For life expectancy, for both pre-SAL and SAL periods, the constant and the
coefficients of AGDP and d2AGDP and OAL dummy are significant. Again in terms
of both the intercept and slope the regression results for the OAL countries seem to be
different to those for the base group of NAL countries. The positive slope for both
periods indicate a stronger relationship for the OAL countries, at a constant rate, with
the income variable. The constant for the 70-85 period signals a systematically lower
life expectancy in OAL countries ( by almost six years ), while for the 86-92 period
despite an increase in the level of life expectancy in general, this level for OAL
countries is lower by nearly seven years as compared to that of the NAL countries.
This lower rate is compensated by a higher slope for the income variable. Both
differentials for OAL countries are significant at a higher level for the SAL period.
There is no significant difference between the EIAL and NAL countries for the life
expectancy indicator. For both periods R
2 is rather high and F is highly significant.15
Table 4 Regression results for social indicators - model (3)
      1970 - 1985
Coefficient   t-value
  1986 - 1992
Coefficient   t-value
Infant mortality rate
   AGDP      -0.021         -5.63
**        -0.012      -5.74
**
   d1AGDP      -0.001         -0.26        -0.002      -0.53
   d2AGDP      -0.008         -1.39        -0.007      -2.02
*
   EIAL Dummy      -2.141         -0.15         2.821       0.25
   OAL  Dummy     17.019          1.36       23.867       2.31
*
   Constant   136.720        14.39
**     107.376     14.09
**
R
2                  0.58                   0.65
F                22.2
**                 27.3
**
Life expectancy
   AGDP       0.004           6.31
**         0.003        6.67
**
   d1AGDP       0.001           1.26         0.001        1.26
   d2AGDP       0.002           2.25
*         0.002        2.72
**
   EIAL Dummy      -2.508         -0.94        -3.209      -1.30
   OAL  Dummy      -5.688         -2.39
*        -6.966      -3.10
**
   Constant     47.311         26.10
**       52.682      32.03
**
R
2                              0.69                   0.70
F                34.7
**                 37.0
**
Adult literacy
   AGDP       0.012           4.24
**         0.007       3.60
**
   d1AGDP       0.003           0.73         0.001       0.59
   d2AGDP       0.005           1.33         0.004       1.14
   EIAL Dummy      -1.537          -0.16       -0.469      -0.06
   OAL  Dummy    -11.160         -1.36        7.888       1.22
   Constant     31.445           4.81
**      41.374     10.37
**
R
2                  0.61                   0.55
F                19.8




   AGDP       0.008           2.28
*         0.003       1.12
   d1AGDP       0.006           1.29         0.004       1.18
   d2AGDP       0.003           0.59         0.002       0.53
   EIAL Dummy    -16.711         -1.59      -26.540     -2.35
*
   OAL  Dummy       8.721           1.04       12.085      1.19
   Constant     74.818         14.04
**       90.939    15.07
**
R
2                  0.37                   0.37
F                  7.6
**                   6.9
**
Per capita calorie supply #
   AGDP       0.240          7.22
**         0.171        4.74
**
   d1AGDP      -0.104        -2.04
*         0.000        0.01
   d2AGDP       0.001          0.02         0.022        0.41
   EIAL Dummy   230.717          1.93       66.679        0.48
   OAL  Dummy     27.744          0.26      -51.325      -0.40
   Constant 1903.930         22.84
**    2025.628     20.39
**
R
2                  0.60                   0.52
F                22.8
**                 15.4
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.
# Data for calorie supply are for 1986-90.16
As for the regression for the adult literacy indicator only the constant and the
coefficient of AGDP are significant. There seems to be no significant structural
difference between NAL countries and the other two groups of countries. It should be
noted that the tests for heteroscedacticity could not reject the presence of this problem
for this regression for the SAL period (see Table B3 in Appendix B). Hence the results
presented for the 1986-92 period for adult literacy are the weighted least squares
estimates. The significance of F statistics for both periods support the validity of the
model.
Once again the problem of heteroscedasticity did arise in the case of regressions for the
gross primary enrolment ratios for both pre-SAL and SAL periods (see Table B3).
Hence we used the weighted least squares method of estimation. For the 70-85 period,
the coefficient of AGDP and the constant are significant. This means that for the pre-
SAL period there are no significant differences, neither in terms of slope nor the
intercept, between the three groups of countries. The results for the SAL period are
somewhat different. While the coefficient of the AGDP is not significant, the intercept
of the regression and the differential intercept for the EIAL countries are significant.
The negative sign of the latter indicates that the level of the gross primary enrolment
ratio for the EIAL countries are systematically lower than those for the NAL and OAL
countries - just above 64% for the EIAL countries as compared to almost 91% for the
NAL and OAL countries. Despite lower R
2 the F statistics remains significant.
Regressions for the per capita calorie supply indicate significant constant and AGDP’s
coefficient for both periods. However, for the 70-85 period the differential slope for
the EIAL countries, notably with a negative sign, is also significant.
The inter-period comparison for all indicators shows an increase in the magnitude of
intercept and a lower degree of dependence on income. This may be taken as a hint
that the level of the indicators of standards of living are increasingly influenced by
other factors than only income.
Human Development Indices and Structural Adjustment
Some literature recommend the use of composite indices, in addition to the use of
individual indicators of standard of living, for reflecting the overall state of human
development in countries. One example of such indices is the Human Development17
Index (HDI) which has been published by the UNDP since 1990. Another example is
the Modified Human Development Index (MHDI) which is argued to be superior to
the HDI with respect to the treatment of its components and its structure (Noorbakhsh
1996a ). Both indices have three components reflecting longevity (presented by life
expectancy), knowledge (presented by a weighted combination of adult literacy and
combined enrolment ratios) and access to resources (measured by PPP$ per capita
GDP). The value of each of these indices is between 0 and 1 reflecting the lowest and
highest levels of human development respectively. We used these indices, both
computed globally, in a modified version of our last model.  As both indices are
computed for 1992
(4) we initially used the following equation.
  HDI MHDI d d GDP d GDP d GDP u ( ) ( ) ( ) = + + + + + + a a a b b b 0 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 3 2        (4)
The GDP data is for 1992. d1GDP and d2GDP are the new GDP per capita differential
slope variables for the EIAL and OAL countries, respectively. The regression results
for the above equation, presented in Appendix C (Table C1) indicate significantly
meaningful relationships. However, one may argue that this would be expected as GDP
per capita is itself a component of the HDI and MHDI. For this reason we replaced the
dependent variable (s) in equation (4) by the non-income components of both indices
(HDI# and MHDI#). The results are presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Regression results for the non-income components of  human development
indices - model (4)
                             Dependent variable HDI#                 Dependent variable MHDI#
Variable Coefficient  t-ratio    Coefficient     t-ratio
GDP 3.368E-05   4.71
**     4.688E-05     4.74
**
d1GDP 5.900E-06   0.54     9.709E-06     0.64
d2GDP 3.978E-05   3.14
**     5.607E-05     3.21
**
EIAL Dummy -0.024  -0.46      -0.050    -0.69
OAL Dummy -0.153  -3.16
**      -0.232    -3.47
**
Constant  0.501 14.33
**       0.399     8.25
**
  R
2              0.58                 0.59
  F            21.9
**               23.1
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.18
The results for both non-income composite indices of human development are
interesting. The coefficients for the GDP, slope differential for the OAL countries, the
OAL intercept and the NAL intercept itself are all significant at the 1% level. This
means that there are significant differences between the OAL and NAL countries with
no significant slope or intercept difference between the EIAL and NAL countries. A
closer look at the magnitudes of the coefficients reveals that in the case of OAL
countries the influence of the GDP on human development indices is much more
pronounced (a much higher slope of (b1+b3) 7.346E-05 for the HDI# and 10.295E-
05 for the MHDI#) as compared to those for the NAL group (3.368E-05 and 4.688E-
05 respectively). The differential intercepts for the OAL countries indicate lower
intercepts of 0.348 and 0.167 (a a 0 3 + ) for the HDI and MHDI respectively. The
coefficients of determination are high and the F statistics are significant at the 1% level.
The overall picture supports the suggestion that while the role of income is important
in human development it seems that it is stronger in the case of the OAL countries,
however, there are significant negative differential intercepts which affect the final
outcome for this group. The overall effects, along with such effects for other models
are later presented in Table 8. Tests of heteroscedasticity concluded that there is no
evidence of the presence of this problem in data (see Table B4 in Appendix B).
It is often argued that in the case of low-income developing countries human
development aspects, such as education and health, have an important role to play in
the development process of the country concerned. A preliminary inspection of the
HDI and MHDI reveals that for the EIAL and NAL groups the average values of the
HDI and MHDI are above their averages for all countries in the sample (Table 6). On
the other hand the average values for the low-income countries in all three groups are
far below the overall averages for the sample and the world.
(5)19
Table 6. Average values for human development indices.
 HDI MHDI
EIAL 0.599 0.503
  Low-income 0.425 0.312
  Middle-income 0.759 0.680
OAL 0.476 0.355
  Low-income 0.328 0.191
  Middle-income 0.718 0.624
NAL 0.609 0.519
  Low-income 0.393 0.284
  Middle-income 0.722 0.642
All countries 0.561 0.459
World 0.759 0.583
This raises a number of related questions. Would the relationship between the human
development indices and the per capita GDP be different for various income groups?
Would there be any differences between the adjustment loan groups in this respect? Is
there any interaction between these income groups and the adjustment loan groups? To
investigate the first two questions we employed the following model.
HDI MHDI d d LId GDP d GDP d GDP dLIGDP u ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = + + + + + + + + a a a a b b b b 0 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 4 1 2
                                                                                                                                                        (5)
The variable LId  is the low-income countries differential intercept (=1 for low-income
countries, =0 for others); and dLIGDP is the slope differential for low-income
countries. In this model we are allowing for the low-income intercept and slope
differentials where our base group is the NAL middle-income countries. The results for
this model are presented in Appedix C (Table C2). For the reason mentioned above we
replaced the human development indices in equation (5) with HDI# and MHDI#. The
results are presented in Table 7.20
Table 7- Regression results for the non-income components of human development
indices - model (5)
                                    Dependent variable: HDI#                            Dependent variable: MHDI#
Variable Coefficient  t-ratio    Coefficient     t-ratio
GDP 1.635E-05   2.20
*     2.178E-05     2.15
*
d1GDP 4.963E-06   0.50     8.454E-06     0.63
d2GDP 2.519E-05   2.14
*     3.489E-05     2.18
*
dLIGDP 6.873E-05   2.39
*     1.021E-04     2.61
**
EIAL dummy -0.012  -0.25      -0.033    -0.51
OAL dummy -0.093  -2.06
*      -0.145    -2.36
*
LId -0.293  -4.39
**      -0.349    -4.71
**
Constant  0.622 15.09
**       0.573   10.21
**
  R
2             0.67            0.69
  F           22.6
**          24.7
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.
Tests of heteroscedasticity concluded that there is no evidence of the presence of this
problem in data (see Table B4 in Appendix B). For both models R
2 are relatively high
and the F statistics are significant at the 1% level. In both models the coefficients of the
GDP are significant while the slope differentials for the EIAL countries are not
significant. The slopes for the OAL countries differ from those of the NAL countries
significantly. For an average OAL country this adds, not considering other effects,
0.099 to the HDI# and 0.134 to the MHDI#
(6). These should be considered next to the
significant and negative differential intercepts of 0.093 and 0.145 for the HDI# and
MHDI#, respectively. Furthermore, the coefficients of the low-income slope
differential variable, dLIGDP, and the low-income intercept, LId, are significant, with
the latter being negative, for both models. Together they demonstrate a higher slope
for the low-income countries but a much lower intercept. Notably, as the magnitude of
the parameters which are not significant ( for which we can not reject the null
hypothesis ) is very small, even if they happen to be different from zero their effects
would be negligible. Nevertheless, to compute the slopes and intercepts for various
groups and sub-groups we dropped those variables in equations (4) and (5) whose
coefficients were insignificant and re-estimated the parameters (for regression results
see tables C3 and C4 in Appendix C). Table 8 presents the effects of different slopes
and intercepts along with the estimated HDI# and MHDI# for average countries.21
Table 8. The effects of different slopes and intercepts for the average country in the
SAL/income groups
                     Slope (* E-05)             Intercept           Average         Estimated
HDI# MHDI# HDI# MHDI# GDP p.c. HDI# MHDI#
EIAL 3.620 5.108 0.491 0.377 3730 0.626 0.568
OAL 7.345 10.295 0.348 0.167 2373 0.522 0.411
NAL 3.620 5.108 0.491 0.377 3872 0.631 0.575
Middle-income
 EIAL 1.844 2.520 0.616 0.560 5759 0.722 0.705
 OAL 4.156 5.646 0.529 0.429 4575 0.719 0.687
 NAL 1.844 2.520 0.616 0.560 5260 0.713 0.693
Low-income
 EIAL 8.667 12.502 0.378 0.212 1531 0.511 0.403
 OAL 10.979 15.628 0.290 0.081 1028 0.403 0.242
 NAL 8.667 12.502 0.378 0.212 1222 0.484 0.365
The effects for the SAL  groups, regardless of their income groups are based on
equation (4) and the results in Table C3 and the effects for the income sub-groups are
obtained from equation (5) and Table C4. The difference between the slopes of the
low-income and middle-income countries are strikingly high indicating that the selected
indices for the low-income countries are more responsive to an improvement in
income, albeit that they start from a relatively lower base (intercept). The estimated
indices show that an average NAL country, regardless of which income group it
belongs to, is marginally better off than an average EIAL country but much better off
than an OAL average country. When the effect of  income levels are taken into
consideration the results are different. There is not much difference between the SAL
middle-income groups, though the order now is EIAL, OAL and NAL for the HDI#
and EIAL, NAL and OAL for the MHDI#. On the other hand the difference between
low-income groups is much more pronounced. The average low-income EIAL country
is better off, followed by the average NAL country with the average OAL country
ranking last by a considerable distance. The difference between the levels of human
development indices for middle-income and low-income groups is expectedly high. It is
important to note that the magnitudes of the intercepts for all sub-groups and groups
are relatively high indicating that HDI# and MHDI# are, to a large extent, determined
by factors other than GDP per capita.22
From Table 8 and the averages of HDI# and MHDI# for different groups and sub-
groups we can compute the income elasticities of the non-income components of
human development indices. They are presented in Table 9.
Table 9. Average HDI# and MHDI# and income elasticities
                        Average                  Elasticities
HDI# MHDI# HDI# MHDI#
EIAL 0.561 0.628 0.241 0.303
OAL 0.411 0.525 0.424 0.465
NAL 0.580 0.633 0.242 0.312
Middle-income
 EIAL 0.722 0.739 0.147 0.196
 OAL 0.675 0.715 0.282 0.361
 NAL 0.690 0.710 0.141 0.187
Low-income
 EIAL 0.386 0.508 0.344 0.377
 OAL 0.249 0.408 0.453 0.394
 NAL 0.371 0.486 0.285 0.314
These elasticities indicate that in terms of human development the average members of
various groups and sub-groups of countries respond differently to a change in income.
While in general the OAL countries are more responsive than the rest, the EIAL and
NAL responses are practically similar. The differences between the income sub-groups
are relatively high. The elasticities for the low-income sub-groups are much higher than
those for the middle-income sub-groups with the highest difference belonging to the
EIAL sub-groups for both indices. Once again the OAL countries are more responsive
in both income sub-groups. There is little difference between the elasticities for the
middle-income EIAL and NAL countries, however, this difference becomes larger in
the case of low-income EIAL and NAL countries.
Interactive Effects
In equation (5) we implicitly assumed that the differential effects of the income factor
is constant across the EIAL, OAL and NAL countries. At the same time we implied
that the differential effects of being in any of our adjustment loan groups is constant
across both income categories. That is, if the human development indices are lower for
the low-income sub-group this so regardless of which group the low-income sub-group
belongs to. Similarly if the HDI# or MHDI# is different for a SAL group it is so23
regardless of whether the members of the group are in a low-income or in a middle-
income sub-group. In effect we have not allowed for interaction between these factors.
In other words the results for the income sub-groups in Tables 8 and 9 based on
equation (5) allow for the additive effects of groups and sub-groups on the HDI# and
MHDI#. There may exist an interactive effect between the two factors of SAL and
income. That is, the effects may be of a multiplicative nature. The inter-group and sub-
group differences exhibited in Tables 8 and 9 hint at such a possibility, for example the
extent of  differences between groups vary as we move from one sub-group to another.
In order to consider the possible interaction between our adjustment loan dummies and
the income level dummy we employed the following model for the low-income sub-
group.
HDI MHDI d LId d LId d LId GDP d LIdGDP d LIdGDP d LIdGDP u #( #) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = + + + + + + + + a a a a b b b b 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 3 2 4 3
                                                                                                                             (6)
Dummy variables d1LId and d2LId reflect the interactive intercepts between our two
grouping criteria, that is being an EIAL and low-income country and being an OAL
and low-income country, respectively.
(7) The d3LId is a new dummy variable (=1 for
the low-income NAL countries and =0 for others). This will allow for the differential
intercepts for all sub-groups to be estimated. The differential slopes are presented by
d1LIdGDP for the low-income EIAL countries, d2LIdGDP for the low-income OAL
countries and d3LIdGDP for the low-income NAL countries. The base category for
this equation is, therefore, the middle-income countries.
Similarly we can measure differentials for the middle-income sub-groups from the base
category of low-income countries by using the following equation.
HDI MHDI d MId d MId d MId GDP d MIdGDP d MIdGDP d MIdGDP u #( #) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = + + + + + + + + a a a a b b b b 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 3 2 4 3
                                                                                                                             (7)
All variables in equation (7) are defined in the same way as in equation (6) but for the
middle-income countries. For example, variables d1MId and d2MId reflect the
interactive intercepts between our two grouping criteria, that is being an EIAL and
middle-income country and being an OAL and middle-income country, respectively
and so on.  Hence the base category for equation (7) would be the low-income
countries. Table 10 presents the estimated parameters for the above equations.24
Table 10- Regression results for the non-income components of human development
indices - Equations (6) and (7)
                                    Dependent variable: HDI#                            Dependent variable: MHDI#
Low-income countries equation (6):
Variable Coefficient  t-ratio    Coefficient     t-ratio
GDP  2.139E-05   3.64
**     2.946E-05     3.69
**
d1LIdGDP -1.625E-05  -0.36    -1.732E-05    -0.28
d2LIdGDP  2.252E-04   3.70
**     3.229E-04     3.91
**
d3LIdGDP  7.473E-05   1.79     1.114E-04     1.96
d1LId -0.109  -1.31      -0.173    -1.53
d2LId -0.452  -6.02
**      -0.654    -6.40
**
d3LId -0.238  -3.47
**      -0.342    -3.67
**
Constant  0.605 17.57
**       0.541   11.56
**
  R
2             0.70            0.72
  F           25.5
**          28.1
**
Middle-income countries equation (7):
Variable Coefficient  t-ratio    Coefficient     t-ratio
GDP  1.050E-04   3.82
**     1.524E-04     4.06
**
d1MIdGDP -8.108E-05  -2.73
**    -1.190E-04    -2.93
**
d2MIdGDP -6.712E-05  -2.10
*    -9.827E-05    -2.24
*
d3MIdGDP -8.953E-05  -3.11
**    -1.326E-04    -3.37
**
d1Mid  0.271   3.33
**     0.393     3.53
**
d2Mid  0.212   2.34
*     0.293     2.36
*
d3Mid  0.300   4.68
**     0.451     5.14
**
Constant  0.327   8.64
**     0.135     2.61
**
  R
2             0.65            0.67
  F           21.0
**          22.9
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.
Tests of heteroscedasticity concluded that there is no evidence of the presence of this
problem in data (see Table B4 in Appendix B). For both models R
2 are relatively high
and the F statistics are significant at the 1% level.
Looking at the results for both HDI# and MHDI# for the low-income sub-groups, as
compared to the middle-income countries, there are significant interactive slope
differential for the OAL low-income countries. There are also significant interactive
effects in the form of interactive intercepts for the low-income OAL and also for the
low-income NAL countries.
For the middle-income sub-groups, as compared to the low-income countries, all the
estimated parameters are significant. That is, all the slope and interactive intercept
differentials for the SAL middle-income countries are significant indicating that there
are meaningful differences amongst all middle-income SAL groups of countries.25
The interactive slopes and intercepts along with the estimated HDI# and MHDI# for
average countries are presented in Table 11
(8).
Table 11. The interactive effects of different slopes and intercepts for the average
country in the SAL/income groups
                             Slope (* E-05)             Intercept          Average         Estimated
HDI# MHDI# HDI# MHDI# GDP p.c. HDI# MHDI#
Middle-income
EIAL 2.388 3.341 0.598 0.527 5759 0.735 0.719
OAL 3.784 5.417 0.540 0.428 4575 0.713 0.676
NAL 1.544 1.982 0.627 0.586 5260 0.708 0.690
Low-income
 EIAL 3.259 4.620 0.527 0.424 1531 0.577 0.495
 OAL 24.661 35.240 0.153 -0.113 1028 0.406 0.249
 NAL 3.259 4.620 0.444 0.314 1222 0.484 0.370
The non-income components of the human development indices predicted  from the
interactive models exhibit some differences with the previous results in Table 8. The
interactive differential slopes for the low-income OAL countries have increased
significantly while those for the low-income EIAL and NAL countries have decreased.
As for the middle-income countries the slopes for the OAL and NAL countries are
now lower with that of the EIAL group being higher. It should be noted that the
magnitudes of the intercepts for all sub-groups and groups, except that of the OAL
low-income sub-group, are relatively high indicating that HDI# and MHDI# are, to a
large extent, determined by factors other than GDP per capita. In fact for the EIAL
and NAL countries the intercept counts for between 81 to 92 percent of the value of
the HDI# and MHDI#. On the contrary the low intercept - and negative in the case of
the MHDI# - correspond to the high dependence of the index for these countries on
income.







 EIAL 0.129 0.139
 OAL 1.018 0.888
 NAL 0.107 0.11626
The elasticities for the interactive models (Table 12) as compared to those in Table 9
indicate an increase for the EIAL middle-income average country and a drop for the
other middle-income countries. As for the low-income countries there are decreases
for the EIAL and NAL sub-groups while the NAL sub-group experiences a significant
increase.
Overall, with a minor exception, the income elasticities of the HDI# and MHDI# for
the EIAL countries are somewhat higher than those for the NAL countries. However,
once the magnitude of the elasticities are taken into consideration, it seems that the
contribution of the income factor, relative to the effect of the non-income factors, is
minimal. Hence the difference between the elasticites are trivial. In the case of the NAL
countries the opposite is the case as the respective elasticities are much higher.
Conclusions
The results of the descriptive analysis showed that the level of the real GDP per capita
has grown faster in the average EIAL country, as compared to the same in the other
two groups. Evaluated with respect to this target, the structural adjustment
programmes may be regarded as successful. However, there is no such clear pattern
emerging for other indicators of standards of living.
We examined a number of models to see if the change in the income level has enhanced
other aspects of standards of living. While inter-country variations in GDP per capita
explain variations in social indicators significantly, there has been little evidence of -
meaningful differences between the regression intercepts for the EIAL, OAL and NAL
countries, with one exception. Furthermore this picture has not changed during the
SAL period. The exceptional case is that  of the gross primary enrolment ratio where
the OAL countries seem to be doing better than the NAL countries before and during
SAL periods; however, the EIAL countries are worse than both other groups during
the SAL period. In the case of the infant mortality rate and life expectancy, the model,
allowing for the slope and intercept differentials, resulted in some differences between
the OAL and NAL countries. Overall the results seem to support the proposition that
standards of living, while depending on income, are relatively more influenced by other
factors.27
The relationship between the non-income components of human development indices
and the income indicator provided further support for the group differences and the
proposition mentioned above. Furthermore, in terms of such indices the income sub-
groups of the SAL groups in our sample seem to have more in common. Allowing for
the presence of two factors, the SAL group and income group, resulted in significant
differences  between low-income and middle-income countries, and between OAL and
others. While the income slope for the OAL, and in particular for the low-income OAL
countries, seems to be much higher, these countries have a lower intercept as
compared to others. This indicates that for these countries income has a relatively
higher influence on the selected indices than other factors. For the average country in
each group the predicted HDI# and MHDI# revealed different orders where the NAL
countries seem to be slightly better off than the EIAL, and much better off than the
OAL, countries. However, when the income group differentials are taken into account
the ranking order according to the MHDI# is EIAL, NAL and OAL for both middle-
income and low-income countries.  With respect to the HDI# the ranking order for the
middle-income countries is somewhat  different. Overall the income elasticities of the
non-income components of human development indices examined here are higher for
the low-income countries as compared to those for the middle-income countries with
those for the OAL sub-groups being the highest. However, the relatively high
magnitude of the intercept in almost all cases , with the exception of the OAL
countries, indicates that other aspects of human development are by far more
important than the income component. Allowing for the interactive effects of the SAL
and income grouping resulted in more differences amongst countries. For the middle-
income countries all slope and intercept differentials proved to be significant. The slope
for the low-income OAL countries increased substantially demonstrating the very high
income elasticity of the non-income components of human development indices for
these countries. Once again, with the exception of the OAL countries, the income
factor seems to have a minimal effect on the HDI# and MHDI#.
In drawing any conclusion we should bear in mind that the effects of structural
adjustments are expected to take place in the long-run. The EIAL countries which
have had a longer period of adjustment programmes, have not achieved an effective
link between the income and the non-income components of human development. In28
the light of these results the inevitable question is: was the concentration of adjustment
programmes on income growth as the main target the right policy? On the other hand
the high income elasticities for the OAL countries suggest that targeting growth in
income for these countries seems to be justifiable. The overall  policy implication of
this study has to be that the structural adjustment programmes should include
components aiming at the non-income aspects of human development where the
relative extent of such components may be different for various countries depending on
their circumstances.29
Notes
(1)  For examples of such studies see OECD (1992) and Stewart (1995).
(2)  We checked this list with the list provided in Corbo (1992). The primary source
mentioned in both cases were the World Bank.
(3)  In this case R
2 does not have the usual properties, though it is presented.
(4)  See Human Development Report (1995) and Noorbakhsh (1996a).
(5)  For the world averages see UNDP 1995 and Noorbakhsh (1996 b).
(6)  Which are found by multiplying (b1+b3) by the GDP per capita for the average
OAL countries.
(7)  They are found by multiplying the relevant dummy variables e.g. d1LId= EIAL
dummy * LId.
(8)  For low-income countries those variables with insignificant coefficients were
dropped and the parameters for the remaining variables were estimated. For results
see Table C5 in Appendix C.30
Appendix A
Country classification - SAL and income groups.
EIAL Countries
   Low-income:
Bolivia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan,  Senegal,
Tanzania, Togo, Zambia.
   Middle-income:
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Jamaica, Korea, Mauritius, Mexico,
Morocco, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey.
OAL Countries
   Low-income:
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Gambia,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda,
Zaire.
   Middle-income:
Argentina, Congo People’s Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia,
Panama, Tunisia, Uruguay,  Zimbabwe.
NAL Countries
   Low-income:
Benin, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Rwanda, Sri Lanka,
Yemen.
   Middle-income:
Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala,
Jordan, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal,
South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela.
Source: World Bank (1992).
Note: Yugoslavia included in the original World Bank list has been excluded.
Appendix B
Tests of heteroscedasticity - We used the Park test for investigating the presence of
this problem which is suspected in the case of cross-country regressions. The tables in
this appendix are the results of the following regressions.
ln( $ ) ln u AGDP v i i i
2 = + + a b
where  the logarithm of the square of the estimated error term of the original
regression is regressed on the logarithm of the explanatory variable (shown as LAGDP
in the tables) of the original regression. If b  turns out to be significant then we have an
evidence of heteroscedastic data. The Spearman rank correlation test was also used as
a supportive test. In this test the rank correlation between  $ ui  and the explanatory
variable of the original regression is computed. If this coefficient is significant the
evidence of heteroscedastic data would not be rejected.31
In the following tables, corresponding to the models in the text, if the Park test
suggested the presence of this problem and this was supported by the Spearman test
we concluded that the error term was heteroscedastic. In such a case the weighted
least squares method of estimation was employed.
Table B1. Tests of heteroscedasticity for models in Table 2 in the text
      1970 - 1985
Coefficient   t-value
Spearman rank
correlation
  1986 - 1992




   LAGDP     0.158        0.48      0.054    -0.008     -0.03     -0.014
   Constant     4.230        1.75     5.161      2.34
*
R
2 = 0.00        F = 0.23 R
2 = 0.00    F = 0.14
Life expectancy
   LAGDP     0.192       0.78      0.116    -1.207     -1.89     -0.040
   Constant     0.885       0.49     2.688       7.44
**
R
2 = 0.01        F = 0.61 R
2 = 0.04    F =3.58
Adult literacy
   LAGDP    -0.628     -0.44    -0.047    -1.220     -1.84      0.236
   Constant   18.280      1.78    5.205     13.52
**
R
2 = 0.00        F = 0.20 R




   LAGDP    -0.808     -2.71
**    -0.299
*    -0.645     -2.28
*      0.310
*
   Constant   10.802      4.98
**     9.784      4.53
**
R
2 = 0.10        F = 7.35
** R
2 = 0.08    F = 5.22
*
Per capita calorie supply #
   LAGDP     0.719       2.37     0.261
*     0.085      0.11      0.146
   Constant     4.271       1.94     9.635    21.71
**
R
2 = 0.06       F = 5.63
* R
2 = 0.00    F = 0.01
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.
# Data for calorie supply are for 1986-90.
Table B2. Tests of heteroscedasticity for models in Table 3 in the text
      1970 - 1985
Coefficient   t-value
Spearman rank
correlation
  1986 - 1992




   LAGDP    -0.314       -0.60      0.011    -1.346     -1.81     -0.112
   Constant     5.827        1.54     5.089      11.77
**
R
2 = 0.00        F = 0.36 R
2 = 0.04    F = 3.30
Life expectancy
   LAGDP     0.310       0.93      0.148    -0.034     -0.11     -0.059
   Constant    -1.332     -0.55     1.611       0.67
R
2 = 0.01        F = 0.87 R
2 = 0.00    F =0.01
Gross primary enrolment
ratio
   LAGDP    -0.903     -1.05    -0.213    -0.067    -0.30     -0.089
   Constant     4.085      12.85
**    5.022      2.95
**
R
2 = 0.02        F = 1.10 R
2 = 0.00    F = 0.09
Per capita calorie supply #
   LAGDP     0.432      1.30     0.204     0.557      1.47      0.197
   Constant     6.086      2.52
*     5.509      1.92
R
2 = 0.02        F = 1.68 R
2 = 0.03    F = 2.16
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.
# Data for calorie supply are for 1986-90.32
Table B3. Tests of heteroscedasticity for models in Table 4 in the text
      1970 - 1985
Coefficient   t-value
Spearman rank
correlation
  1986 - 1992




   LAGDP     0.156        0.43      0.089    -0.113     -0.37     -0.070
   Constant     4.185        1.57     5.697      2.46
*
R
2 = 0.00        F = 0.18 R
2 = 0.00    F = 0.14
Life expectancy
   LAGDP     0.490      1.55      0.213    -0.029     -0.11     -0.034
   Constant    -1.495     -0.65     2.223       1.11
R
2 = 0.03        F = 2.39 R
2 = 0.00    F = 0.01
Adult literacy
   LAGDP    -0.041     -0.15    -0.016    -0.855     -2.49
*      0.248
*
   Constant     5.026       2.49
*   10.707      4.10
**
R
2 = 0.00        F = 0.02 R




   LAGDP    -1.018     -2.91
**    -0.238
*    -0.555     -1.81      0.281
*
   Constant   12.025      4.71
**     8.962      3.81
**
R
2 = 0.11        F = 8.45
** R
2 = 0.05    F = 3.26
*
Per capita calorie supply #
   LAGDP     0.593       1.78     0.262
*     0.168      0.500      0.120
   Constant     5.010       2.07
*     8.484      3.34
**
R
2 = 0.04       F = 3.16 R
2 = 0.00    F = 0.25
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.
# Data for calorie supply are for 1986-90.
Table B4. Tests of heteroscedasticity for models in Tables 5, 6 and 7 in the text
          HDI#
Coefficient   t-value
Spearman rank
correlation
         MHDI#
Coefficient   t-value
Spearman rank
correlation
Equations (4) - Table 5
   LGDP    -0.559      -1.70     -0.115    -0.343    -0.83     -0.106
   Constant    -1.501      -0.59    -2.741    -0.85
R
2 = 0.03        F = 2.90 R
2 = 0.01    F = 0.69
Equations (5) - Table 7
   LGDP     -0.016      -0.05      -0.062    -0.286      -1.11     -0.118
   Constant     -5.863     -2.44
*    -3.016      -1.50
R
2 = 0.00        F = 0.00 R
2 = 0.01    F =1.22
Equations (6) - Table 10
   LGDP     0.149      0.49      0.014    0.025       0.08     -0.064
   Constant    -7.186    -3.00
**   -5.771     -2.25
*
R
2 = 0.00        F = 0.24 R
2 = 0.00    F = 0.01
Equations (7) - Table 10
   LGDP    -0.154     -0.55     -0.125   -0.446      -1.30     -0.153
   Constant    -4.626     -2.10
*   -2.032     -0.76
R
2 = 0.00        F = 0.30 R
2 = 0.02    F = 1.68
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.
# Data for calorie supply are for 1986-90.33
Appendix C
Table C1. Regression results for the human development indices - model (4)
                             Dependent variable HDI                 Dependent variable MHDI
Variable Coefficient  t-ratio    Coefficient     t-ratio
GDP 5.358E-05   8.36
**     5.911E-05     7.82
**
d1GDP 6.377E-06   0.65     8.724E-06     0.75
d2GDP 4.189E-05   3.69
**     4.848E-05     3.63
**
EIAL Dummy -0.026  -0.54      -0.040    -0.72
OAL Dummy -0.152  -3.50
**      -0.190    -3.72
**
Constant  0.401 12.80
**       0.290     7.84
**
  R
2              0.77                 0.75
  F            53.3
**               49.1
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.
Table C2- Regression results for the human development indices - model (5)
                                  Dependent variable: HDI                                Dependent variable: MHDI
Variable Coefficient  t-ratio    Coefficient     t-ratio
GDP 3.222E-05   5.56
**     3.747E-05     5.04
**
d1GDP 5.127E-06   0.67     7.337E-06     0.74
d2GDP 2.394E-05   2.62
**     3.034E-05     2.58
*
dLIGDP 8.241E-05   3.68
**     8.054E-05     2.80
**
EIAL dummy -0.010  -0.27      -0.023    -0.48
OAL dummy -0.078  -2.23
*      -0.116    -2.56
*
LI dummy -0.293  -6.90
**      -0.294    -5.40
**
Constant  0.550 17.15
**       0.441   10.71
**
  R
2             0.86            0.83
  F           70.6
**          53.7
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.
Table C3. Regression results for the non-income components of the  human
development indices - model (4) - with significant coefficients only
                             Dependent variable HDI#                 Dependent variable MHDI#
Variable Coefficient  t-ratio    Coefficient     t-ratio
GDP 3.620E-05   6.76
**     5.108E-05     6.89
**
d2GDP 3.725E-05   3.20
**     5.187E-05     3.22
**
OAL Dummy -0.142  -3.39
**      -0.210    -3.62
**
Constant  0.491 18.99
**       0.377    10.54
**
  R
2              0.58                 0.59
  F            37.1
**               39.1
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.34
Table C4. Regression results for the non-income components of the  human
development indices - model (5) - with significant coefficients only
                                        Dependent variable: HDI#                        Dependent variable: MHDI#
Variable Coefficient  t-ratio    Coefficient     t-ratio
GDP 1.844E-05   2.98
**     2.520E-05     2.98
**
d2GDP 2.311E-05   2.13
*     3.126E-05     2.11
*
dLIGDP 6.823E-05   2.42
*     9.982E-05     2.60
*
OAL dummy -0.088  -2.22
*      -0.131    -2.43
*
LI dummy -0.239  -4.43
**      -0.348    -4.74
**
Constant  0.616 16.76
**       0.560   11.17
**
  R
2             0.67            0.69
  F           32.2
**          35.3
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.
Table C5- Regression results for the non-income components of human development
indices for low-income countries - equations (6)
                                    Dependent variable: HDI#                            Dependent variable: MHDI#
Low-income countries:
Variable Coefficient  t-ratio    Coefficient     t-ratio
GDP  3.259E-05   6.28
**     4.620E-05     6.46
**
d2LIdGDP  2.140E-04   3.31
**     3.062E-04     3.44
**
d2LId -0.374  -4.91
**      -0.537    -5.12
**
d3LId -0.083  -2.06
*      -0.110    -1.99
*
Constant  0.527 19.25
**       0.424   11.25
**
  R
2             0.64            0.66
  F           36.3
**          38.7
**
** Coefficient significant at 1% level.   * Coefficient significant at 5% level.35
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